In my lifetime, the United States has ended two wars – Korea and Vietnam – and pretended to end a third – Iraq. Korea ended in a stalemate that endures to this day, Vietnam was a loss, and it’s way too early to tell about Iraq. But the president has declared an end to the U.S. combat role in Iraq. Since we’re leaving fifty thousand troops behind, I certainly hope somebody told the insurgents.
Withdrawing combat troops is a strange way to win a war anyway. As Winston Churchill told the British after their successful WWII evacuation from Dunkirk, “We must be very careful not to assign to this deliverance the attributes of a victory. Wars are not won by withdrawals.”
But, at least the Iraq War won’t end the way the Vietnam War ended with helicopter flights from the embassy roof. The end in Vietnam was both predictable and predicted by many observers and policy makers including President Eisenhower. A product of a simpler age, Eisenhower actually thought that the nation should not go to war unless the nation agreed to go to war.
That was the job of Congress exercising its responsibilities under the Constitution and declaring war. Eisenhower specifically said that he would not go to war in Indochina unless and until the people of the United States, acting through their elected representatives, voted for a Declaration of War. Besides, along with President Roosevelt, he thought it was a bad idea and he wasn’t about to ask Congress for a war declaration.
Prior to the Japanese takeover of Indochina in the early days of WWII, it was a French colony. FDR adamantly opposed returning Indochina to France after the war. Believing that the French slowed the growth and development of the region and deprived its people of their basic freedom to choose their own governments, FDR made it clear throughout WWII that “French Indochina” would not be French after the war.
Unfortunately, he forgot to tell Harry Truman.
President Truman worried much more about Soviet communism than about some backwater in Southeast Asia. If the price of getting France to join the NATO embryo included giving them their Indochina colony back, Truman paid without hesitation. French President De Gaulle knowing his way around power politics, threatened to take France into the Soviet bloc unless Truman agreed to let France have its old colony back.
Truman, the old poker player, didn’t see the bluff. De Gaulle didn’t have so much as a pair of deuces, but Truman folded anyway and France moved back into Vietnam.
It was Truman, who first hit upon the idea of taking the nation to war without bothering with constitutional niceties, like congressional war declarations. That’s how we ended up fighting the Korean “conflict.” No reason to use a perfectly good Anglo-Saxon word like “war” when a convenient euphemism is at hand; the Constitution is silent about whom shall declare “conflict.”
These “Executive Branch” wars often don’t work out well for the simple reason that not all the American people are behind them in the beginning and no one expects them to last as long or cost as much as they do. The United States alone has suffered forty thousand casualties in Iraq and that doesn’t count all the psychic wounds. No one knows the full extent of the damage done to the Iraqi people and how that weighs in the scale with the removal of Saddam Hussein. By some calculations, we’ve already spent a trillion dollars on the project, mostly on borrowed money. Fifty thousand American troops remain in the country. Moreover, most are fully combat capable and many are on combat missions as you read this, but since they are just “advisers” and “trainers” it doesn’t count as combat.
We’re leaving Iraq the same way we entered Vietnam.